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Abstract. The paper proposes an overview of the literature on 
monetary policy. It shows the influence of t he debates in the 
theoretical literature on the actual implementation of policies, as 
well as the counter effect. The European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) is largely studied as an example of this counter effect 
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For many centuries, monetary policy was seen as a twofold process: 
deciding about the money supply, and deciding to print paper 
money to create credit. While now thought of as part of monetary 
authority, interest rates were not coordinated with the other forms of 
monetary policy. Monetary policy was generally in the hands of the 
executive body, which benefited from seigniorage, or the power to 
print money. 
 
Created in 1694, the Bank of England acquired the responsibility to 
print notes and back them with gold. With this, the idea of monetary 
policy began. The aim of monetary policy was to sustain the value 
of the currency, and print notes. In the late 18th and 19th centuries, 
the establishment of central banks in industrializing nations was 
mostly coupled with the wish to preserve the nation's peg to the 
gold standard. Central banks began setting the interest rates that 
they charged to both their own borrowers, and other banks that 
required liquidity. 
 
During the 1870-1920 period, the industrialized nations set up 
central banks, with one of the last being the American Federal 
Reserve in 1913. The central bank was beginning to take on a new 
role as the “lender of last resort.” This supplementary responsibility 
led to the nationalization of central banks; the Bank of England, for 
example, was nationalized on March 1, 1946. Although the notion 
of interest rate was already debated between the Mercantilists and 
the Physiocrats in the 18
th century, it was also increasingly 
understood that interest rates had an effect on the real economy. It 
also became clear that there was a business cycle, and economic 
theory began emphasizing the relationship between interest rates 
and this cycle. Macroeconomics was born with Keynes’s General 
Theory (Keynes 1936). 
 
In the 1980s, many economists began to believe that making a 
nation’s central bank independent was the best way to ensure a most 
favourable monetary policy. This would prevent the plain Warin: Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices  3 
manipulation of the tools of monetary policies to effect political 
goals. 
 
In the 1990s, central banks began adopting formal inflation targets. 
A central bank may, for example, have an inflation target of 2% for 
a given year. The goal was to make the outcomes, if not the process, 
of monetary policy more transparent. The Bank of England 
illustrates both of these trends. It became independent of 
government through the Bank of England Act 1998 and adopted an 





Monetary policy is the process of overseeing a nation's money 
supply to complete specific objectives such as restraining inflation, 
or achieving full employment. Monetary policy can involve setting 
interest rates, margin requirements, capitalization standards for 
banks, and acting as the lender of last resort. 
 
The primary tool of monetary policy is open market operations. 
This entails overseeing the quantity of money in circulation through 
the buying and selling of a variety of credit instruments, foreign 
currencies, or commodities. Among such credit instruments, one 
finds public bonds. In order to prevent distortion in its 
independence, article 21 of the European Central Bank (ECB)’s 
statutes forbids the Bank from buying public bonds. This makes the 
ECB very unique among monetary institutions across the world. All 
of these purchases or sales result in more or less base currency 
entering or leaving market circulation. Usually the short-term goal 
of open market operations is to reach a specific short-term interest 
rate target. However, monetary policy might entail the targeting of a 
specific exchange rate relative to some foreign currency, or else 
relative to gold instead of targeting interest rates. 
 
For example, the Federal Reserve targets the Fed Funds rate, the 
rate at which member banks lend to one another overnight. In 
Europe, the ECB targets the Main Refinancing Operations Rate, 
also known as Repo. 
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 A policy maker may choose either to apply open market operations 
to reach certain targets (inflation targeting), or to have intermediary 
objectives (monetary aggregates) with no consideration ex ante of 
the outcome in terms of inflation. Let’s have first a look at inflation 
targeting. Inflation is approximated by the rate of change in the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). It requires that a basket of consumer 
prices be monitored, and from these prices a CPI defined. For 
example, the target might be to keep the CPI index between 2% and 
3% per year through periodic changes of the interest rate. The 
interest rate is targeted for a specific period using open market 
operations. In general, the period will vary between months and 
years. As a rule, a committee reviews this interest rate target on a 
monthly or quarterly basis. There has been considerable attention 
paid to simple interest rate rules for monetary policy. These rules 
offer a hypothetical path for the policy instrument — short-term 
interest rates. The Taylor rule is a well known example of a 
monetary policy rule, with the path for the short-term interest rate 
depending on deviations of inflation from target, and output  from 
trend (Taylor 1993). Changes to the interest rate target are made in 
response to a variety of market indicators in an attempt to forecast 
economic trends, and keep the market on track towards achieving 
the defined inflation target. This monetary policy approach was 
initially pioneered in New Zealand. It is currently used in Australia, 
New Zealand, Sweden, South Africa and the United Kingdom. 
Differing slightly from inflation targeting is price level targeting. 
The dissimilarity is that CPI growth in one year is offset in 
subsequent years, such that the aggregate price level does not move 
over time. Price level targeting was used in the 1930’s by Sweden, 
and seems to have helped the Swedish economy during the Great 
Depression. 
 
Second, let’s have a look at monetary aggregates. In the 1980’s, 
while countries faced a double-digit inflation rate, several countries 
used an approach based on constant growth in the money supply. 
This approach was refined to include different definitions of money 
and credit (M0, M1, etc). In the US, this approach was discontinued 
with the selection of Alan Greenspan as Fed Chairman. Called 
monetarism, this approach focu ses on monetary quantities, whilst Warin: Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices  5 
most monetary policy focuses on a price signal of one form or 
another. 
 
Another monetary policy is to enter into a monetary regime in order 
to import the credibility from another central bank. Base money is 
bought and sold by the central bank on a daily basis to target the 
determined exchange rate. For instance, this type of policy is used 
by China. The Chinese Yuan is managed such that its exchange rate 
with the United States dollar is fixed: 1 US$=8.2765 Yuan.  
 
A currency board illustrates a slightly different version of the 
former policy. In order for a currency board to be established, a 
country must decide to relinquish its monetary policy to another 
country. This decision is often made after a country’s unsuccessful 
struggle against inflation. The currency board will no longer issue 
fiat money, but instead, will only issue one unit of local currency 
for each unit of foreign currency it has in its reserve. The growth of 
the domestic money supply can now be coupled with the 
supplementary deposits of the banks at the central bank; these 
deposits equal the additional hard currency reserves in the hands of 
the central bank. In such a system, questions of currency stability no 
longer apply. The drawback is that the country no longer has the 
ability to set monetary policy according to other domestic 
considerations. Hong Kong and Bulgaria operate a currency board. 
Argentina discarded this policy in January 2002 after a severe 
recession. This illustrates the fact that currency b oards are not 
irrevocable, and hence, may be abandoned in the face of speculative 
attacks by foreign exchange traders. 
 
A gold standard is a special case of a currency board where the 
value of the national currency is linked to the value of gold instead 
of a foreign currency. The gold standard is a system in which the 
price of the national currency, as measured in units of gold, is kept 
constant by the daily buying and selling of the base currency. This 
process is called open market operations. The gold sta ndard might 
be regarded as a special case of the “Fixed Exchange Rate” policy, 
and the gold price might be regarded as a special type of 
“Commodity Price Index.” A form of gold standard was used 
widely across the world prior to 1971: the Bretton Woods system. 
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3. Practices since the end of Second World War 
 
At the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, 44 allied countries 
created a new international financial system in which the U.S. dollar 
became the anchor: each member country fixed its currency to the 
U.S. dollar, and the U.S. dollar officially fixed to gold at 35 dollars 
per ounce. When foreign countries had a trade surplus, they could, 
theoretically, have used the excess dollars and asked the U.S. to 
exchange them for gold. With a fixed parity between dollar and 
gold, this would have restricted dollar creation. 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, as the Vietnam War accelerated 
inflation, the United States was running not just a balance of 
payments deficit, but also a trade deficit (for the first time in the 
twentieth century). The crucial turning point was 1970, which saw 
U.S. gold coverage deteriorate from 55% to 22%. In the first six 
months of 1971, $22 billion in assets fled the United States. On 
August 15, 1971, Nixon decided to “close the gold window,” 
making the dollar inconvertible to gold directly, except on the open 
market. 
 
The blow of August 15 was followed by efforts under U.S. 
leadership to develop a new international monetary system. 
Throughout the fall of 1971, there was a series of multilateral and 
bilateral negotiations within the Group of Ten seeking to develop a 
new system. 
 
Gold became a floating asset: in 1971, it reached $44.20 per ounce, 
and in 1972, it climbed as high as $70.30 per ounce and continued 
climbing. By 1972, currencies began abandoning even this devalued 
peg against the dollar. In February of 1973, the Bretton Woods 
system collapsed after a last devaluation of the dollar to $44 per 
ounce. 
 
Since then, the international monetary system has consisted in a 
multitude of different currency arrangements ranging from currency 
unions and currency blocs, to floating exchange rates, with many 
other schemes in between, such as unilateral fixed parities, managed 
floating or currency boards, and currency baskets. Warin: Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices  7 
 
As early as 1970, the members of the European Economic 
Community decided to prepare for the establishment of a common 
currency. The Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) crisis in the early 
1990s severely threatened the Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU) project. 
 
On December 30, 1998, elev en members of the European Union 
locked their currency exchanges at irrevocably fixed rates. This was 




Currently, twelve European countries take part in the European 
Monetary  Union.  Goodhart (1989) notes that “monetary policy 
operations of the Central Banks” can be viewed as “quantity, or rate 
setting actions.” Generally, central banks have viewed short-term 
interest rates as their preferred policy instrument. Occasionally a 
central bank, (such as the German Bundesbank starting in the 
1970s), has focused on monetary aggregates, a practice that still 
survives in the European Central Bank’s much -debated “second 
pillar” of monetary policy. In the process of disinflation beginning 
in the late 1970s, other central banks, such as the Federal Reserve 
and the Bank of England, briefly paid attention to quantity targets. 
 
 
4. Monetary policy in the economic literature 
 
Rules or discretion? This question is at the heart of the modern 
theory of central banks and monetary policy. This debate, which 
took its real dimension after the publication of the General Theory 
by John Maynard Keynes in 1936, has evolved over time. 
Responses to Keynes gave birth to new questions, and the tools 
developed to solve them brought forth new research directions. 
 
Taking as a starting point the work by  Argy (1988) and  Fischer 
(1990), this section gives a brief overview of the theoretical 
literature on the “rules versus discretion” debate  considering also 
                                                   
1 The financial markets were closed from December 31, 1998 to January 3, 1999 
for the switchover. Warin: Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices  8 
historical and analytical points of view. Creating, on purpose, an 
anachronism, the premises and evolution of the debate are 
represented as a simple model in order to create a homogenisation 
of the literature. The reasoning behind this approach is threefold: to 
clarify the dissensions between the various schools of thought; to 
facilitate the description of the common points; and to give the 
debate some congruence with the current literature. Finding its 
geographical origin in the country to first use central banks  – the 
United Kingdom – the debate “rules versus discretion” dates from 
the dissensions between the Currency School, and the Banking 
School that preceded Peel’s Act of 1844. Head of the Currency 
School, though, he deceased in 1823, Ricardo could not attend its 
rise in the 1830s. This school did not conceive the bank deposits as 
money. Ricardo defended the idea that the quantity in circulation 
would fluctuate, as it would if the currency were gold. This implied 
that the balance of payments would determine the changes in the 
quantity of currency. The Currency School was in favour of control 
over monetary growth rather than leaving this decision in the hands 
of the authorities of  Bank of England. Imagining that central 
bankers, framed by clear and transparent statutes, would set up its 
program, the Currency School approaches recent discussions on 
independence of the central banks. 
 
The Banking School was opposed to the idea that bank deposits 
constituted the only currency. Based on the fact that the evolution of 
the stock of money depended on the movements in the reserves of 
the Bank of England, on the one hand, and whether these 
movements were permanent or transitory, on the other, its authors 
criticized the rule of the gold standard. Naturally, the Banking 
School defended the idea of discretionary authorities. However, it 
proposed an abstract rule for the operations of the Bank of England: 
the “Real Bills doctrine.” Credit was to be emitted only at a 
discount on those invoices whose object was to finance real goods 
in the course of production and distribution. In this case, monetary 
creation could never be excessive, i.e. inflationary, since these 
doctrines claimed to bind monetary creation to the real production 
(Sijben 1990). The Act of 1844 ended up separating the Bank from 
England into two entities, an “Issue Department” and a “Banking 
Department,” the latter functioning as a commercial bank. 
Reflecting the ideas of the Currency School, the “Issue Department” Warin: Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices  9 
was to convert banknotes of England into gold or coins according to 
a precise rule of convertibility: there was to be a fiduciary issue of 
18 million pounds, and above that, at the margin, there was to be 
100 % gold reserve for notes. 
 
The debate between the Currency School and the Banking School 
turned to the advantage of the former, and the monetary policy of 
the Bank of England was supposed to follow a simple rule: the offer 
of currency varied according to the gold reserves of the central 
authorities. Although the gold standard is often quoted as an 
illustration of a monetary rule, the functioning of the system 
implied a high degree of discretion on behalf of the  British 
monetary authorities. During the period between 1844 and 1914, the 
Bank of England actively adjusted the discount rate to answer for 
changes in the gold stock. For example, in the case of a deficit in 
the current balance, the Bank of England increased the discount rate 
in order to protect gold convertibility and the gold reserves by 
reducing the outflows of capital and the domestic demand (Schaling 
1995). De facto, discretion overrode the rule. 
 
In 1926-1927, the Congress and the Federal Reserve System (Fed) 
were opposed on the action to be taken regarding monetary policy. 
Congressman Strong wanted to force the Fed to follow a monetary 
rule, whose objective was price stability. Based on the “Real Bills 
doctrine,” Miller, administrator of the Fed, privileged monetary 
discretion (Sijben 1990). The Fed won the debate. The Twenties 
were years when the American monetary policy was very strongly 
discretionary. With that, two explanations: the transformation of the 
Fed as a true central bank by the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 and 
the suspension of the gold standard during the First World War. 
Nevertheless, the act of 1913 made price stability the main goal of 
the Fed, without specifying the means of the central Bank to reach 
this end. At the time of its creation, the Fed was supposed to exist 
within a system of gold standard. But, World War I finally ended. 
During the war, the movements of the discount rates were neither 
limited by the Federal Act Reserve, nor by the need for facing 
external pressure in order to protect the American gold reserves. 
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4a. The Chicago plan 
 
After the Great depression of 1929 (Wheelock 1992), a group of 
economists in Chicago proposed a system in which each bank 
would hold 100 % of reserves on easily verifiable deposits. A whole 
set of specific arguments was developed in favour of the rule- like 
principle of monetary policy in the United States. Entitled the 
“Chicago Plan,” this proposal for a monetary reform had as 
partisans:  Simons (1936),  Fisher (1945), and  Friedman (1959). 
Taking as a starting point the work of Simons, Fisher proposed 
alternative rules such as a rule of stabilization of prices, or a rule of 
constant money supply. 
 
In the first case, the political authorities can have a range of 
instruments, like the discount rate, the coefficient of reserve and 
operations of open market, which they use in a discretionary way. 
As  Sijben (1990) indicates, in this mode, the authorities are 
forcedby the final goals of the monetary policy: the inflation target. 
 
In the last case, the monetary authority could be obliged to respect a 
growth rate of the money supply, for example X% per annum. This 
approach to the rule is constrained by the instruments of monetary 
policy, i.e. intermediate objectives ( Poole and Rosenthal 1986). 
Taking again the typology of Fischer (1994), under the mode of the 
authority, the central bank has an independence of objective, 
whereas under the mode of the rule, it does not have independence 
in the choice of the instruments. 
 
The ideas of Simons, and more generally of the Chicago School, 
would be taken up and adapted a few years later by Milton 
Friedman at the time of a new era for the macro-economy that 




Born in the Great Depression of the late 1920’s and the beginning 
of the Second World War, the Keynesian revolution moved aside 
the question of the choice of the monetary modes to address a new 
problem:  what economic policy should be to set up in order to 
reach full employment ( Lerner 1944)? Centering the debate on a Warin: Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices  11 
more specific question, the Keynesians postulated discretion, 
insofar as their analyses required interventions with economic 
instruments. In 1936, J. M. Keynes pleaded in favour of 
discretionary policies, because of the multiplier effect on economic 
growth.  
 
Logic was deterministic: the political authorities led the monetary 
and fiscal policies by knowing the structure of the model perfectly. 
Based upon information in sufficient quantities, and an ideal model 
comprising multiple targets and instruments, the political authorities 
were able to choose a “good” policy-mix. 
 
According to  Argy (1988), the analytical base of the Keynesian’s 
policies of stabilization which followed the war, can be summarized 
by the three following proposals: 
1.  The money wages of full employment were rigid, 
2.  The private sector was very unstable because of strong 
investments, or weak investments, 
3.  A negative shock of demand could lower employment. 
 
With rigid money wages, there was no automatic mechanism for 
adjustment. In the event of negative shock of demand, the political 
authorities could increase the price level, to reduce the real wages, 
and consequently, to restore the full employment. The choice 
between the monetary policy and the budgetary p olicy depended 
upon the structural coefficients of the Keynesian model. 
 
4c. Phillips’s developments 
 
In the original Keynesian model, the money wages are rigid, and are 
unable to explain inflation. This gap was filled by Phillips (1958), 
who  highlighted a nonlinear relationship between the level  of 
unemployment and growth rate of the money wages in the United 
Kingdom during the period 1861  - 1957. The “Phillips curve” 
suggests the possibility of arbitration between the inflation of the 
wages and the rate of unemployment. This arbitration rests at the 
origin of the modern prolongation of the “rules versus discretion” 
debate.  Phillips suggested that inflation resulting from an 
expansionist monetary policy could have positive impacts on 
employment, emphasizing the necessity to have discretionary Warin: Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices  12 
policies.  Friedman, however, (1959) countered this proposal and 
favoured the growth rate rule of money stock. The adoption of a 
monetary rule would allow for price stability while avoiding 
fluctuations created by discretionary policies. This debate was 
reborn with the appearance of new analysis tools; game theory bent 
the debate over “rules versus discretion” towards a debate over 
“credibility versus flexibility.” 
 
Phillips was not the first to have highlighted such a relationship 
between inflation and the rate of unemployment. Humphrey (1985) 
associates the following authors to the “prehistory” of the Phillips 
curve: Hume (1955), Thornton (1939), and Tinbergen (1951). 
Samuelson and Solow (1960) replicated the Phillips curve to fit the 
United States. But, it was Lipsey (1960) who would give theoretical 
foundations to this empirical relationship; at the time, he 
reformulated it as being a process of dynamic adjustment of the 
labour market. 
 
4d. Friedman’s refinements 
 
Well before Friedman, many critics questioned the Phillips curve. 
More precisely, the theoretical foundations brought by  Lipsey 
(1960) gave rise to many of these discussions. Holmes and Smyth 
(1970) explain why there are no reasons to suppose that there is a 
direct relationship between the surplus demand for work, and the 
rate of unemployment. But the strongest attacks were those of 
Friedman (1968) and  Phelps (1968) in connection with the 
monetary illusion. 
Poorly specified according to Friedman, the Phillips curve was to be 
formulated by considering the growth rate of real wages rather than 
nominal wages. In practice, trade unions negotiate wages in 
monetary terms on t he basis of the forecast rate of inflation. 
Friedman specified the Phillips curve in terms of the anticipated real 
wages, called henceforth the “expectations-augmented Phillips 
curve.” 
 
Phelps (1967) launched a second phase of the modern debate 
following this work showing the concept of natural rate of 
unemployment. A natural rate of unemployment corresponds to the 
balance  between the job market and full employment production. Warin: Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices  13 
When the economy does not face a supply or demand shock, the 
balance holds. In case of a monetary shock, a long-term deviation 
from this natural rate of unemployment is impossible. 
 
4e. The modern reading of the debate 
 
The bases of the New Classical School can be found in the works of 
Lucas (1972) , Sargent (1973), and Sargent and Wallace (1975). The 
object of this new argument is twofold: at the same time, it is a 
question of reconsidering the Phillips curve in the light of the 
assumption of rational anticipations; and a question regarding the 
insistence upon the monetary origin of inflation (Fourçans 1975). 
Consequently, unemployment deviates from its natural rate only if 
there are random deviations of the offer of currency compared to its 
systematic component. 
 
The natural r ate of unemployment theory was, nevertheless, not 
enough to shake the Keynesian edifice, as it did not exclude the 
relative efficacy of monetary policy in the short-run. Since Lucas 
(1972), the “New Classical School” defends the idea that systemic 
governmental action cannot produce long-lasting effects on output 
and employment by manipulating aggregate demand. Discretionary 
monetary policy would, accordingly, be ineffective due to the 
rational formation of expectations by economic agents. The “rules 
versus discretion” debate was tipped towards the rule more than the 
discretion. 
With the “time inconsistency” concept, the 2004 Nobel prizes 
Kydland and Prescott (1977) created a turning point. There exists a 
temptation for a central bank not to respect ex post its own ex ante 
monetary objectives. The assumption that agents have rational 
expectations of this temptation creates an inflationary bias. Thus, 
the possibility that monetary authorities will not respect their own 
commitments reduces the confidence that economic agents have in 
these individuals. 
 
Why would a government in charge of the monetary policy fool 
agents’ expectations? The answer is twofold. Firstly, it can change 
its policy because of external events, (e.g. an asymmetric economic 
shock that hits the country). Secondly answer is the one studied by 
several analysts known as the political business cycle, a finding of Warin: Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices  14 
Nordhaus (1975). When important elections are approaching, the 
government may want to falsify agents’ expectations in order to 
give a short run impulse to the economic activity and benefit from 
the fruits of the welfare improvement that follows. 
 
This lack of confidence and its repercussion on inflation through the 
inflationary bias has authorized the creation of a new concept: 
“credibility.” Several authors,  since  Barro and Gordon (1983), 
wonder about the options available to improve the credibility of a 
central bank, while keeping open the potential to stabilize the 
economy. Barro and Gordon (1983) proved that the inflationary bias 
could be reduced if the central bank improved its credibility. They 
were the first authors to explain that the degree of confidence in the 
central bank is relevant for economic agents when they form their 
expectations on future inflation. However, their study did not 
propose a practical way of improving the credibility of the monetary 
authority. 
 
Rogoff (1985) proposes the appointment of a “conservative central 
banker” to increase credibility. It is question of selecting a 
candidate whose risk aversion is well known by every agent. Such a 
central banker must be more risk averse to inflation than the 
average economic agent. This model is the one that created the 
momentum for the modern theory of central banks. In parallel to 
this criterion of risk aversion, which is delicate to implement, the 
literature developed some new institutional extensions. 
 
Lohmann (1992) discusses the possibility to reintroduce Milton 
Friedman’s proposal of the “k% rule.” That is to say the possibility 
of forcing the central bank to commit itself to a monetary rule.  
Because all agents know the rule, it allows them to integrate the 
inflation forecast into their salary contracts. Hence, the option to use 
the monetary policy to stabilize the economy is non-existent. 
 
Neumann (1991) recalls the advantages of monetary management 
by an independent central bank. On the one hand, the inflationist 
bias would almost disappear, and on the other, the central bank 
would keep an option to stabilize the economy in the case of an 
economic shock via a well-suited monetary policy  
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However, some authors discuss the advantages of an independent 
central bank. Independence separates the monetary power from the 
political power, and the central banker is the only authority in terms 
of monetary decisions.  Fratianni and Huang (1995),  as well as 
Waller (1995), applied the agency theory to the relationship 
between a central banker and economic agents. The manager of a 
central bank is in charge of monetary production, when the agents 
are in a position vis-à-vis the central bank that looks like 
stockholders of the central bank. Agents are interested in the fact 
that the central bank produces the best currency possible, i.e. 
properly adjusted to the money demand, without the breaching of 
the initial commitment. The central banker’s goal is to augment 
his/her personal utility function. There may be an incompatibility 
between the objective of the best currency possible and the personal 
utility function of the manager. Indeed, the latter may want to 
augment the central bank’s return by offering more money than the 
economy demands, causing a depreciation of the value of the 
money in the economy at large. In order to prevent this outcome, a 
control procedure must be implemented forcing the central banker 
to renounce to his/her commitments in terms of the stability of the 
value of the money. Here too, the rule dominates discretion. 
 
Facing some authors’ scepticism on “independence” as a means 
without any objective,  Walsh ( 1995) studies the possibility of 
performance contracts. New Zealand could be used as an 
illustration. What do performance contracts consist of? It is 
basically an incentive given by the government to the central banker 
to abide by his/her policy announcements to increase credibility In 
other words, if the incentive is a salary premium, the central banker 
will received this benefit if he/she succeeded at the end of the 
period in achieving the goals stated at the beginning of the period. 
 
In a parallel to this literature aimed at finding concrete solutions to 
the credibility problem, options have since been developed by Barro 
and Gordon (1983),  Backus and Driffill (1985), and  Canzoneri 
(1985) who brought an explanation of the lack of credibility using 
game theory refinements. The “rules versus discretion” debate has 
become a “credibility versus flexibility” debate. Canzoneri 
introduces the concept of private information in the game between 
agents and the central bank; the latter has information that agents do Warin: Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices  16 
not have. Canzoneri explains that when agents play a cooperation 
strategy, in other words not including an inflationist bias in their 
expectations, the central bank has a real interest in not playing a 
cooperation strategy, but cheating. He demonstrates that the 
equilibrium between both players is when they play a non-
cooperative strategy. He justifies the fact that the inflationist bias 
always exists except if one finds a way to force the central bank to 
remain in the cooperative equilibrium. He explains the idea that the 
inflationist bias stemming from temporal inconsistency is the 
outcome of non-cooperative strategies from players. 
 
In retrospect, whatever the methodology used to study the 
inflationist bias i s (Barro and Gordon, Backus and Driffill, 
Canzoneri or Fratianni and Waller) solutions seemed to tend 
towards a rule of monetary production rather than discretionary 
intervention of the central bank. However, for some authors, 
monetary authorities must continue to play a key role, not only in 
the respect of the rule, but also in the absorption of exogenous 
shocks by an adequate monetary policy. For instance, at the 
international level, the monetary policy must remain discretionary; 
if one wants to avoid destabilizing economic policies, one must link 
the national monetary policy to a stable international monetary 
system through a fixed but adjustable exchange rate mechanism. 
Thus, when there is no shock, the country will import the low 
inflation from the international system, but in case of an economic 
shock, one would keep all latitude to absorb it via expansionary 
monetary policy. 
 
The study of exchange rate mechanisms has closely accompanied 
the literature about optimal currency areas ( Mundell 1961). The 
exchange regime’s integration in the economic analysis seems 
obvious due to its close relationship with the practice of monetary 
policies. A fixed exchange rate mechanism disciplines the central 
bank through integrating it in an international monetary system, yet 
allows it to act independently in the very short-run, if necessary. 
 
If one compares both approaches, credibility enhancing and fixed 
exchange rate systems, the former does not consider the open 
economy model, while the latter is built upon it. 
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The next question is to know whether it is possible, and desirable, to 
look at the credibility concept while introducing the open economy 
assumption. The international pressure on the national monetary 
policy must be included in the study of the credibility of a central 
bank. First, it is question of confronting a central bank to another 
bank to measure the impact of a lack of credibility on the exchange 
rates. Then, it is necessary to consider the exchange rates by 
themselves. Indeed, it seems impossible to constrain the question of 
monetary policy to a closed-economy model, and moreover the 
study of optimum currency areas (Mundell 1961). Policymakers in 
open economies face a macroeconomic trilemma ( Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh and Taylor 2004): 
1.  To stabilize the exchange rate; 
2.  To enjoy free international capital mobility; 
3.  To engage in a monetary policy oriented toward domestic 
goals. 
 
While the second item is a given, and the third is the goal, the first 
item is the adjustment variable: in case of an inappropriate 
monetary policy, the exchange rate will adjust to the new economic 
conditions. One can imagine a large risk premium due to the lack of 
credibility of one currency on the world market.  
 
Some authors have started to work in this direction. In the field of 
European monetary integration,  De Grauwe (1992) used a 
methodology close to  Barro and Gordon (1983) to measure the 
differences in terms of credibility between two countries of the 
European Union. Martin (1996) includes the exchange rates in a 
model built upon the assumptions drawn from  Barro and Gordon 
(1983) in order to respond to a precise question: the relevance of the 
excluded countries from the euro zone. 
 
In the consideration of the open economy assumption, it seems 
interesting to try t o ascertain what changes in the strategies of 
players, and to measure the impact on exchange rates. From there, it 
would be possible to determine the criteria according to which an 
exchange rate regime is more credible than another. To this end, the 
work b y  Herrendorf (1999) opens a path. This author develops a 
reputation model with information asymmetries in an open 
economy setting and opposes flexible exchange rates with the Warin: Monetary Policy: From Theory to Practices  18 
argument that asymmetry generates instability. With the birth of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, as well as with the discussions 
around new monetary unions, these questions are very relevant. 
 
In both a fixed and flexible exchange rate mechanism, the 
inflationist bias is prevalent. The realization conditions, and the 
conditions for the success of a monetary union, have to be analyzed 
using the inflationist bias concept. If a country is part of a fixed 
exchange rate mechanism, its credibility is not reliant upon its 
decisions. If it is part of a flexible exchange rate mechanism, 
integration into a fixed exchange rate zone is a means to improved 
credibility (Herrendorf 1999, Melitz 1988). 
 
The stakes are high, as the European Economic and Monetary 
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